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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

2 MAY 1975

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MEMORANDUM FOR [REDACTED]

National Intelligence Officer for
Strategic Programs
Central Intelligence Agency

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SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Analysis of Perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet
Strategic Balance

I appreciate your interest in improved understanding of the
perceptions of the state and trends in the strategic balance

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The report completed [REDACTED] under the management guidance of
the Office of Political Research, provides interesting reading
but lacks analytical depth and deals with a disappointing
fraction of desired product outlined in the proposed outline
which we as consumers prepared last December. (Attached)

As an experiment in consumer articulation of needs and
responsiveness of one part of CIA, the experience was not
encouraging.

Again, your personal support in this effort was much
appreciated.

Jim
James P. Wade, Jr.
Deputy Assistant Secretary

Attachment:a/s

Copy to: LTG Wilson

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

Study of Perceptions of the Strategic
Balance Expressed in Other Nations, 1972 & 1974

Time Frame

The study will initially concentrate on the time periods of 2-3 months before and after the SALT I Moscow Summit in May, 1972 and the Vladivostok Summit in November, 1974. In its second phase, the study should cover the 1972-1974 period, to provide a firmer basis for establishing trends in the perceptions, and the factors which stimulate and shape statements of perceptions of the current and expected state of the strategic balance.

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Purpose

The principal purpose of the study is to provide some detailed factual basis for discussion and analysis of the nature and trends in the perceptions of foreign political elites and general publics of the current state (1972-1974) and expected trends in strategic balance.

The study should determine what aspects of the strategic balance are important as bases for perceptions of the strategic balance. Specifically, it should identify factors (such as static measures) or events which prompt and shape statements of perceptions of the strategic balance; such as the Summits in May, 1972 and Nov, 1974, demonstrations of technology and force capability such as Soviet MIRV tests, C5A drop of MINUTEMAN and resupply to Israel, declaratory policy such as Posture Statement and budgetary actions such as Congressional approval of FY 1975 strategic R&D initiatives.

The study should include the implications explicitly and implicitly drawn by the foreign observers of the state and trends in the strategic balance for the credibility of US deterrent posture, for desired relations with the US, for their own nation's defenses and behavior, and for Soviet propensity to take risks and press for advantage.